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JAMES L. REGENS* and ROBERT W. RYCROFT**

Options for Financing
Acid Rain Controlst
Over the past decade, the phenomenon of acid deposition, commonly
referred to as "acid rain,"' has been subject to growing scientific research
as well as widespread media coverage. Such attention has fostered a
corresponding increase in public awareness as well as acrimonious debate
about the extent to which acid rain constitutes an environmental risk
requiring prompt regulatory action to mitigate or prevent its effects. As
a result, acid deposition has been transformed from a relatively unnoticed
area of scientific inquiry into one of the paramount environmental issues
of the 1980s.
Acid rain first emerged as a public policy concern at the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm when Swedish
scientists asserted that precipitation acidity attributable to sulfur dioxide
(SO 2) emissions from man-made sources, primarily industry and utilities,

was causing adverse ecological and human health effects. 2 Largely in
response to the Swedish study, the Norwegian Interdisciplinary Research
Program, the SNSF Project, was started in 1972. It focused on establishing
the effects of acid precipitation on forests and fish. 3 In 1972, acting under
*Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Director, Institute of Natural Resources,
University of Georgia.
"Associate Professor of Public Affairs and Political Science; Deputy Director, Graduate Program
in Science, Technology, and Public Policy, George Washington University.
tAn earlier version of this article was presented as a paper at the 45th annual Conference of the
American Society for Public Administration, Denver, Colorado, Apr. 8-11, 1984. It received the
James E. Webb award as the most meritorious paper presented at that Conference.
1. "Acid rain" commonly refers to what is more precisely identified as the wet and dry processes
for the deposition of acidic inputs to ecosystems. Acidity is measured on the logarithmic pH scale
(pH equals the negative log 10 of the hydrogen ion concentration); a solution that is neutral has pH
7.0. The "natural" acidity value often is assumed to be pH 5.6 calculated for distilled H20 in
equilibrium with atmospheric CO 2 concentrations. However, the presence of other naturally occurring
species-SO2 , NH 3, organic compounds, windblown dust--can produce "natural" values of pH 4.9
to 6.5. See Charlson & Rodhe, Factors Controlling the Acidity of NaturalRainwater, 295 NATURE
683 (1982).
2. Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Royal Ministry of Agriculture, Pollution Across National
Boundaries: The Impact on the Environment of Sulfur in Air and Precipitation (Sweden's Case Study
for the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Sweden, 1982).
3. The SNSF Project, entitled "Acid Precipitation-Effects on Forest and Fish," was the largest
multidisciplinary study in Norwegian history. Its annual budget was approximately 10 million Norwegian Kroner ($2 million U.S.) for the period from 1972 to 1980. The SNSF Project involved
cooperative research by 12 Norwegian institutions and more than 150 scientists; it produced two
major scientific conferences, the first held midway through the study at Telemark, Norway, in June
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the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), eleven European nations also launched a cooperative
effort to measure the contribution of local and transboundary sources to
each participating country's sulfur deposition.' The OECD study concluded that SO2 emissions could be transported long as well as short
distances. In five of the eleven countries participating in the study, more
than 50 percent of total sulfur deposition was estimated to come from
non-domestic sources.' While meteorological changes and more accurate
emissions inventories can significantly alter an individual country's contribution, the OECD study reinforced the conclusion that some proportion
of the acid deposition occurring over almost all of northwestern Europe
is due to transboundary pollution.
During the early 1970s, studies conducted in Canada and the United
States produced similar concerns about acid deposition's possible environmental consequences. 6 Thus by the mid-1970s, Sweden, Norway,
Canada, and the United States reported declining pH and speculated about
possible impacts on aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. 7 Other western
European countries such as the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic
of Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria have become increasingly more
concerned as potential acid deposition impacts have been identified in
both their own and neighboring states!
1976. See Report of the InternationalConference on the Effects of Acid Precipitation in Telemark,
Norway, 5 AMBIo 200 (1976), and Impact of Acid Precipitation on Forest and Freshwater Ecosystems
in Norway, Research Report (F.H. Braekke ed. 1976). The second conference, at Sandefjord, Norway,
in March 1980, concluded the SNSF Project and provided a forum to evaluate the state-of-existentknowledge. See L.N. Overrein, H.M. Seip & A. Tollan, Acid Precipitation-Effects on Forest and
Fish (Final Report of the SNSF Project 1972-80, SNSF Rep. No. 19) (1980).
4. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [HEREINAFTER CITED AS OECD],
THE OECD PROGRAMME ON LONG-RANGE TRANSPORT OF AnR POLLUTANTS (1977). Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom actively participated in the study. Italy participated on a more
limited basis in some of the data collection. Data collected by aircraft sampling and at 76 ground
monitoring sites were reported monthly to the Norwegian Institute for Air Research which coordinated
the study. See Onar,Monitoring Long-Range Transport ofAir Pollutants: The OECD Study 5 AMBIO
200, 203-16 (1976).
5. Id. The five net importers were Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. However,
because of serious problems with national emissions data as well as the accuracy of atmospheric
transport models, the OECD findings are subject to plus or minus 50 percent error for individual
receptor estimates.
6. See Beamish & Harvey, Acidification of the LoCoche Mountain Lakes, Ontario and Resulting
Fish Mortalities 29 J. FISHERIES RESEARCH BOARD OF CAN. 1131 (1972); Likens, Bormann & Johnson,
Acid Rain, 14 ENV'T 33 (1972); Cogbill & Likens, Acid Precipitation in the Northeastern United
States, 10 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 1133 (1974).
7. E.B. Cowling, An Historical Resume of Progress in Scientific and Public Understanding of
Acid Precipitation and Its Consequences (Oslo, Norway, SNSF Project 1981); and Cowling, Acid
Precipitation in Historical Perspective, 15 ENV'T SCI. & TECH. I 10A (1982).
8. See ECOLOGICAL IMPACT OF ACID PRECIPITATION (Oslo, Norway, SNSF Project 1980) (D.
Drablos & A. Tollan eds. 1980).
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Acid rain's prominence has produced attempts to develop policies which
address it in a variety of forums in the years since the 1972 Stockholm
Conference. The OECD has adopted recommendations for national SO 2
emissions control programs and endorsed attempts to reduce transboundary air pollution. 9 Parallel efforts initiated in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) culminated with the 1979 Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. The Convention provides
a basis for multilateral cooperation and formally became active in 1983
after receiving ratification by twenty-four of the thirty-four ECE member
countries. Both the OECD and ECE endeavors reflect the "polluter pays"
principle. That concept of international law, emerging from the Trail
Smelter case as well as the 1972 Stockholm Conference, states that nations
bear a responsibility to ensure that their actions do not damage foreign
environments.' 0 However, the OECD and ECE rely on voluntary international cooperation to achieve compliance with any emissions targets.
Presumably, such compliance would be achieved through the use of the
best available technology that is economically feasible. "
In the North American context, the United States and Canada have
made limited progress in developing a bilateral agreement on transboundary air pollution. In 1978, the two governments established a Bilateral
Research Consultation Group on the Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants to coordinate the exchange of scientific information on acid deposition. 12 During the fall of 1978, the United States Congress passed a
resolution calling for bilateral discussions to preserve and protect the two
nations' mutual air resources. On August 5, 1980, the two governments
signed a Memorandum of Intent concerning Transboundary Air Pollution
(MOI) as a framework for bilateral negotiations. Formal negotiations to
address air pollution problems started in the fall of 1981 and currently
are marked by disagreement over a 1982 Canadian proposal for joint 50
percent reductions in SO 2 emissions. U.S. officials labeled the idea as
9. MacNeill, Coal and Environment:Constraintor Opportunity in OECD, COSTS OF COAL POLLUrION
ABATEMENT 55-62 (E.S. Rubin & I.M. Torroens eds. 1983).

10. The OECD countries unanimously subscribed to the 1972 U.N. Declaration on the Human
Environment, including Principle 21, which states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
1i. See G.S. WETsToNE & A. ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA (1983);
and Carroll, Acid Rain-Acid Diplomacy, in THE ACD RAIN DEBATE (E.J Yanarella & R.H. Ihara
eds. 1985).
12. A.P. ALTSHULLER & G.A. MCBEAN, THE LRTAP PROBLEM IN NORTH AMERICA: A PRELIMINARY
OVERVIEW PREPARED BY THE UNITED STATES-CANADA BILATERAL RESEARCH CONSULTATION GROUP
ON LONG-RANGE TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTANTS (1979).
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being "premature" and instead urged continued cooperation under the
auspices of the MOI to enhance scientific understanding of the phenomenon.13
As a consequence, the Canadian government initially declared that it
would unilaterally seek to reduce emissions by 25 percent. 4 Subsequently,
the environment ministers of Canada and nine western European countries
signed a declaration in Ottawa on March 21, 1984 to reduce sulfur emissions at least 30 percent in the coming decade as a means to pressure
neighboring countries to make similar pledges. Since then, the United
States and Canada have continued to discuss possible efforts to address
the acid rain problem. The most recent product of these negotiations is
a March 19, 1986 joint endorsement of a report prepared by Canadian
and American special envoys on acid rain. This report recommends the
initiation of a five-year, five billion dollar program for commercial demonstration of clean coal technologies. '"While the United States and Canada have not concluded a bilateral agreement to control transboundary
air pollution, especially acid deposition, legislation proposing substantial
reductions in United States SO 2 emissions has been introduced in each
Congress since 1981. Support for the various proposals is mixed in the
full Senate and House, but it is clear that the politics of acid rain are
increasingly fluid.' 6
The focus of the acid rain policy debate, internationally as well as
domestically, has shifted increasingly away from questions of scientific
knowledge to discussions of how to allocate the costs of emissions reduction programs. Because sulfate (S04= ) is the major constituent of acid
deposition in eastern North America as well as in Europe, advocates of
controls have emphasized reducing SO 2 emissions. As a result, this article
examines how control costs might be financed. It considers revenue generation under the normal utility rate-making process or by alternatives to
that process, and what the political implications of those financing options
might be. However, because the very complexity of the phenomenon in
conjunction with the cost of controls makes agreement on equitable reduction strategies difficult to achieve, it is important to consider the
13. See Sweet, Acid Rain, in

EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: PROSPECTS

AND PROBLEMS 61-80 (1982); and Marshall, Ruckelshaus Disappoints Canadians on Acid Rain, 22
SCIENCE 401 (1983).
14. Marshall, Canada Goes it Alone on Acid Rain Controls, 223 SCIENCE 1275 (1984).

15. D. Lewis & W. Davis, Joint Report of the Special Envoys on Acid Rain (mimeo, Jan. 1986);
and Remarks by the President and Prime Minister Mulroney in Signing of NORAD Agreement and
Statement on Acid Rain (mimeo, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Mar. 19, 1986).
16. A.M. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1979); Maraniss, Congress' Search for an Acid Rainbow, I WASH. POST WEEKLY ED. 6-7 (Feb.
13, 1984); and Crandall, An Acid Test for Congress, 8 REGULATION 21-28 (1984).
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scientific and economic justifications for such a program before examining
the possible options for financing.
THE SCIENCE AND ECONOMICS OF ACID RAIN
Scientific Aspects of Acid Rain
Robert Angus Smith, an English chemist, might well lay claim to the
title of "father of acid rain." Smith's pioneering studies of precipitation
chemistry and its effects first used the term "acid rain." Drawing upon
data from England, Scotland, and Germany, Smith demonstrated that
variation in regional factors such as coal combustion, wind trajectories,
the amount and frequency of precipitation, proximity to seacoasts, and
the decomposition of organic materials affected sulfate concentrations in
precipitation. 17 Smith's work, however, was largely ignored and failed
to generate follow-up research.
Professor Ellis Cowling asserts that contemporary concern about acid
deposition and its effects originated in three seemingly unrelated areas:
limnology, agricultural science, and atmospheric chemistry.' 8 Svante Oden,
a Swedish scientist, in the first major attempt to integrate knowledge from
those disciplines, maintained that analyses of air mass trajectories matched
to temporal and spatial changes in precipitation chemistry indicated that
sulfur and nitrogen were transported long distances.' 9 Oden asserted that
clearly identifiable source and receptor areas existed making acid rain a
large-scale regional phenomenon with long-term adverse ecological consequences. Thus, information produced by a complex and rapidly evolving body of research forms the scientific basis for defining the acid deposition
problem.
With the exception of the Hubbard Brook Experimental Forest in New
Hampshire, continuous North American precipitation monitoring data
have been available for less than a decade. As a result, long-term trends
for the United States and Canada are defined poorly.2° Precipitation chemistry data collected in the 1970s, however, do indicate that acid deposition
occurs throughout eastern North America. The area of greatest acidity is
17. R.A. SMITH, AIR AND RAIN: THE BEGINNINGS OF CHEMICAL CLIMATOLOGY (1872).
18. Oden, The Acidification of Air and Precipitation and Its Consequences in the Natural Environment, SWEDISH NAT'L ScI. RESEARCH COUNCIL ECOLOGY COMM. BULL. (No. 1, 1968).
19. Id.
20. Trend studies for North America have been subject to considerable controversy because of
differences in collection methods, siting criteria, chemical analysis techniques, sample storage methods, and quality assurance. The lack of a sufficient number of continuous sampling sites is a source
of possible error, too. For an elaboration, see Regens, Acid Rain: Does Science Dictate Policy or
Policy Dictate Science?, in ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON ACID DEPOSITION 5-19 (T.D. Crocker ed.
1984).
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concentrated over eastern Ohio, western New York, and northern West
Virginia. 21 Higher elevation, rural areas in the western United States also
have low pH rainfall, most probably due to significant increases in nitrogen oxide (NO.) emissions from multiple sources throughout the region.22 While broad geographical generalizations derived from individual
monitoring site data are subject to considerable uncertainties,23 there is.
a potential for near continental-scale impacts.
Conclusive evidence exists for chemical and biological alterations,
including fish losses, in lakes and streams which have limited capacities
to neutralize acidic inputs.24 While documented losses are limited to a
small percentage of the U.S. lakes that have been studied, there are
possibly thousands of sensitive watersheds throughout eastern North America
which may be susceptible to acidification.25 For example, a preliminary
estimate indicates that 74.2 percent of the lakes in the northeastern and
4.2 percent of those in the midwestern United States are sensitive.2 6
Evidence of damages to nonaquatic ecosystems, especially forests, as
well as to unique cultural artifacts and buildings or other structures, is
largely circumstantial; yet, such damages are plausible and evidence is
growing. 27 For example, adverse effects may result from the leaching of
soil nutrients or via the mobilization of toxic metals. As a result, concern
exists about harmful, long-term effects which acid deposition may have
21. U.S.-Canada Work Group 2, Atmospheric Science and Analysis (Final Report, EPA 1982).
22. Lewis & Grant, Acid Precipitationin the Western United States, 207 SCIENCE 176-77 (1980).
23. Work Group 2 of the U.S.-Canada MOI concluded that individual monitoring station values
were reasonably accurate but that the uncertainty in isopleth map lines generalized from site data
was about ± 20 percent in magnitude and 50-200 km in position for eastern North America. The
degree of uncertainty would be higher for western North America because fewer monitoring stations
are located there.
24. Alkalinity provides a measure of the instantaneous ability of water bodies to assimilate acidic
inputs. Lakes with surface water alkalinity in excess of 200 microequivalents per liter (ILeq/I) generally
are assumed to be resistant to acidification. Because disagreement exists with respect to a threshold
value below which lakes are sensitive to current deposition loading rates, the 200 lieq/l may represent
an upper bound. The actual loss in aquatic alkalinity depends on how much of the increased SO 4 is
balanced by increases in base cations. See J.M. Omernik, Total Alkalinity of Surface Water (EPA
Envt'l Research Lab., Corvallis OR, 1983).
25. The reader should be cautious about equating sensitivity with actual damages. For example,
a 14 year study (1966-80) with periodic sampling of biological, chemical, and physical data from
1,140 Wisconsin lakes, that was supplemented by general limnological data collected in 1979 through
a comprehensive random sample of 25 percent of all lakes and impoundments 75' deep and 25 acres
in size, provides no conclusive evidence that would indicate any lake has experienced permanent
change in pH or alkalinity since early this century. See Lillie & Mason, Limnological Characteristics
of Wisconsin Lakes, in 138 Wis. DEPT. NAT. RESOURCES TECH. BULL. (1983).
26. M. Levin, Acres of Low Alkalinity Lakes in the Northeastern and Upper Midwestern U.S.
(unpublished paper for EPA) (1983). The study calculated the proportion of total lake area (acres
of water) with alkalinity levels below 200 lieq/l. The upper Midwest includes northern Wisconsin,
upper Michigan, and northeast Minnesota. The northeast includes New England and New York. The
Great Lakes and Lake Champlain were excluded from the analysis.
27. See Johnson & McLaughlin, The Nature and Timing of the Deteriorationof Red Spruce in
the Northern Appalachian Mountains, in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACID DEPOSITION: LONGTERM TRENDS 200-30 (1986).
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on trees, particularly on spruce, pine, aspen, and birch. Professor Herbert
Vogelmann asserts that studies of mature forests in the northeastern United
States indicate reduced growth patterns as well as increased mortality in
recent decades for primarily coniferous species.8 However, because linkages are complex, conclusions about forest effects remain somewhat
equivocal since acid deposition is one of a variety of stresses affecting
forest ecosystems. Growing concern exists about the possible impacts of
acid deposition on cultural artifacts, buildings, and other structures. Field
studies have linked such damage to air pollution, especially in areas
having high ambient SO 2 concentrations. Unlike respirable sulfates, however, acid deposition does not appear to represent a direct risk to human
health. But limited health risks may be associated with episodic events
of acid fog or the leaching of metals such as lead into drinking water
supplies.
Economic Aspects of Acid Rain
Professor Thomas D. Crocker and Professor James L. Regens provide
a discussion of potential as well as limits of formal economic analyses
to guide policy choice in the acid rain area. They note that a limited
number of attempts have been made to assess those benefits and costs.29
For example, the maximum annual economic benefits of eliminating all
acid deposition effects on existing economic activities in the eastern third
of the United States clearly appear substantial.3" Yet, the estimates in
Table 1 are based primarily on effects whose magnitude still is being
delineated. In fact, while Professor Crocker and his associates are confident that the rank-ordering of benefit categories is accurate, their $5
billion damage estimate properly is viewed as illustrating a methodology
for calculating such an estimate rather than an absolute value. Crocker
makes this point:
Given the scant knowledge available both about the changes physical and biological systems undergo when exposed to acid deposition,
28. Vogelmann, Catastrophe on Camel's Hump, 91 NAT'L. HIST. 8-14 (1982); and Wetstone &
Foster, Acid Precipitation:What Is It Doing to Our Forests?, 25 ENV'T 10-12, 38-39 (1983).
29. Economic analyses generally do no more than multiply natural science findings about service
flow changes by an invariant price. The researchers then speculate, if they recognize them at all,
how the resulting estimate would differ if price responses and agent adaptations were captured.
Because of the differences in the behavior of emitters and receptors when a market in emissions
rights does and does not exist, and because of the lack of parallel markets, economically efficient
outcomes for the acid deposition problems may be impossible to trace exhaustively. The economic
criterion is then reduced to whether those who gain from a change in precursor control could, in
principle, compensate the losers and still have some residual gain. For a discussion of the theoretical
basis for applying the technique to acid deposition control, see Regens & Crocker, Applying BenefitCost Analysis to Acid Rain Control, I MGMT. SCI. & POL'Y ANALYSTS 12-17 (1984).
30. Crocker, Tschirhart & Adams, A First Exercise in Assessing the Benefits of ControllingAcid
Precipitation in 7 METHODS OF DEVELOPMENtr FOR AssErsING ACID PRECIPITATION CONTROL (T.D.
Crocker, et. al. eds. 1980).
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Table I. Rank-ordering
of Annual Maximum EconomicLossesAttributable to Acid Deposition in theEasternThird of the United
States,
Effects
Category
Materials
Forestecosystems
Direct agricultural
Aquaticecosystems
Others(health,water supplysystems, etc.)

Maximum Losses
(1978 $ Billion)
2.00
1.75
1.00
0.25
0.10

'Estimates are for the potentialtotalbenefits dueto thecompleteelimination of aciddeposition
effects.
From:Crocker,Tschirhart& Adams,A First Exercise in Assessing the Benefits of Controlling Acid Precipitation. in 7 METHODS
DEVELOPMENT
FORa
ASSESSlNO
Acm PREcirTATIN CONTROL
BENEFITS
(T.D. Crocker et al. eds. 1980).

and the equally poor knowledge about the price, activity, and location
responses of economic agents to these system changes, any estimate
right now of the total benefits of controlling acid deposition appears
foolhardy. '

Deriving cost estimates for any reduction strategy also depends upon
the analyst making a variety of assumptions. It is necessary to speculate
about the effectiveness of various control options, future trends in emissions, the political feasibility of the different options, the stringency of
current and future environmental regulations, levels of economic activity,
energy prices, and technological innovation. Clearly, uncertainty surrounds each factor. Nonetheless, information about control costs is somewhat more tangible, at least in an aggregate sense.
Control measures are available for reducing emissions of the major
precursors of acid deposition. Technology exists to reduce man-made
emissions of SO2 , NO., and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). If one
assumes no change in existing environmental regulations, the current
level and geographical distribution of SO 2 emissions by source category
such as utilities, industrial boilers, and smelters should be roughly stable
through the year 2000. Future trends for emissions of VOCs and NO
are less certain. Total VOC emissions commonly are assumed to decline
until 1990, primarily due to significant reductions in transportation sector
emissions. After 1990, conventional wisdom holds that VOC emissions
will then perhaps approach 1980 levels by the year 2000 due to increased
industrial sector activity. The rate of growth in NO, emissions should
continue to decrease for the balance of the 1980s. Total NO, emissions
in 2000, however, are projected to exceed 1980 levels.32 Given current
31. T.D. Crocker, Prior Information Required to Assess the Economic Benefits of Controlling
Acid Deposition, in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Critical Assessment Document-Draft
(1982).
32. It is important to exercise considerable caution in making estimates of future NO, levels.
This is the case because NO, estimates are extremely dependent on assumptions about vehicle miles
traveled and industrial source emissions rates. As a result, future estimates should be viewed a "best
judgment" rather than absolute approximations.
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technological limits and realistic projections of economic growth, it is
reasonable to conclude that S02 emissions are likely to remain stable at
roughly the 1980 level over the next twenty years. On the other hand, it
also is prudent to assume that emissions of the other major precursors
may increase in the foreseeable future."
Over the long-term, a significant reduction in SO 2 emissions may result
as existing sources are displaced by facilities subject to new source performance standards (NSPS). The NSPS program was and still is envisioned by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to be a long-term
strategy for limiting total emissions of pollutants into the atmosphere. As
older facilities are replaced by newer ones, NSPS limits emissions so
that they will not increase proportionately with industrial growth. The
NSPS also restrains the ability of individual states to "compete" for new
industry by enacting standards that differ from those of their neighbors.
Making the standard applicable only to new sources also protects existing
markets for coal. Thus, it avoids the employment dislocations which
would result from a wholesale shift from high-sulfur coal to low-sulfur
coal by existing sources. However, as Regens notes:
[blecause NSPS involves determining standards for individual industry categories, it is not the most economically efficient way to
limit or decrease total emissions. The strategy also ignores the availability of cost-effective emission reductions from existing sources.
Moreover, although the philosophy behind stringent performance
standards for new sources is sound, the regulations have had less
impact on total emissions than was originally expected . . . The
strategy is also based on imposing costs in the future rather than in
the present. Imposing significantly different standards between existing and new sources also promotes more subtle disparities. For
example, the scrubbing requirement for new power plants ....
As
a result, older, dirtier plants are operating at a higher capacity to
minimize total generating costs. In effect, the NSPS control system
is providing less of an emissions reduction than society should be
getting for the money which it is investing in air pollution abatement.34
It remains debatable, therefore, whether the replacement of existing
sources with new ones will result in emissions levels sufficient to reduce
acid deposition loadings to environmentally acceptable targets. Such replacement rests on three key assumptions. First, growth rates in the
electric utility and other major emitting sectors must remain relatively
33. U.S.-Canada Work Group 3B, Emissions Costs and Engineering Assessment (Final Report,
EPA 1982).
34. Regens, The Regulatory Climate for Coal Development in COSTS OF COAL POLLUTION ABATEMErTe104-11 (E.S. Rubin & I.M. Torrens eds. 1983).
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low in comparison to historical rates. Second, technological advances
must permit the adoption and implementation of more stringent NSPS or
innovative incentives for emissions control must be developed, thereby
reducing aggregate emissions. Finally, no significant adverse ecological
effects, especially irreversible damage, can occur within the next thirty
to forty years. To the extent these assumptions are valid, then the opportunity costs of achieving additional reductions now are substantial
relative to known as opposed to plausible damages.
Given uncertainty regarding dose-response functions, it is also possible
to argue that widespread but not necessarily irreversible damages may
occur unless large reductions in emissions, especially SO 2, happen in the
near-term. Proposals for imposing control strategies now focus on reducing SO 2 emissions to achieve SO 4= deposition reduction because of
the greater difficulty in capturing significant NO, emissions reductions
and the uncertainty over whether nitrate acidity (NO 3 = ) is as harmful as
sulfate acidity." Moreover, because of economics of scale for pollution
control efforts in the utility sector vis-a-vis the industrial sector, capturing
SO 2 reductions from utilities instead of industrial sources appears to be
relatively more cost-effective. 36 Table 2 indicates that it is generally more
cost effective to switch to lower sulfur coals or residual oil rather than
to employ flue gas desulfization. However, such switching poses potential
social and economic problems in terms of regional losses of miners' jobs
due to coal market shifts. While the engineering economics of limestone
injection multi-stage burners (LIMB) seem promising, LIMB commercialization does not appear likely prior to the mid-1990s. In addition,
because of the time required to move from the pilot to demonstration to
commercial stage for a new technology, LIMB is not going to be a major
option for retrofit on existing power plants before then even if its development and demonstration expenses are underwritten substantially by the
federal government.
In order to estimate the actual costs of an SO2 emissions reduction
program in terms of control costs, coal market shifts, or electricity rate
increases, the analyst must specify a number of prior conditions. Both
the size of the emissions reduction, commonly called a "rollback," and
the geographical area in which those emissions reductions are required
have to be defined. The time schedule for the implementation of additional
35. J.A. Fay, D. Golumb & J. Gruhl, Controlling Acid Rain, Mass. Inst. Tech. Energy Laboratory
Rep. No. MIT-EL83-004 (1983).
36. Electric utility sources produced an estimated 65 percent of total SO 2 emissions in 1980 for
the United States and are projected to dominate future trends. Coal-fired power plants are the primary
source of those emissions. But because most plants are located in attainment areas, compliance with
the current National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) is not likely to significantly reduce
SO 2 emissions from existing sources. See infra note 32.
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Table 2. Incremental Costs of SO2 Emissions Reduction Strategies
Costs (S/Ton SO)

Reduction Strategies
COAL CLEANING
N. Appalachia & E. Midwest Coal
S. Appalachia Coal

$50-600
$700-1000

UTILITY STRATEGIES'
Fuel Switching
Shift from High to Low Sulfur Coal
Shift from High to Medium Sulfur Coal
Shift from Medium to Low Sulfur Coal
Shift from High to Low Sulfur Residual Oil

$250-350
$350-400
$400-500
$300-400

Flue Gas Desulfurization (FGD)
Shift from Unscrubbed High to Scrubbed High
Shift from Unscrubbed Medium to Scrubbed Medium
Shift from Unscrubbed Low to Scrubbed Low
Limestone Injection Multi Staged Burners (UMB)
High Sulfur Coal
Medium Sulfur Coal
Low Sulfur Coal

$400-600
$600-1500
$1800-3000

b

$250-500
$300-I 100
S600-2000

$200-350
$250-700
$500-1200

c

INDUSTRIAL STRATEGIES
Fuel Switching
Shift from High to Low Sulfur Coal
Shift from High to Medium Sulfur Coal
Shift from Medium to Low Sulfur Coal
Shift from High to Low Sulfur Residual Oil
Flue Gas Desulfurization
Shift from Unscrubbed
Shift from Unscrubbed
Shift from Unscrubbed

(FGD)
High to Scrubbed High
Medium to Scrubbed Medium
Low to Scrubbed Low

$250-350
$350-400
$400-500
$300-400
$400-600
$600-1500
$1800-3000

*Representative costs for 500MW power plant. Costs will vary for eachregion and year.
bRemoval of SO2 for retrofits expected to be between 50% and 60%.
cRepresentative costs for 170MM Btu/hr industrial boiler. Costs will vary for eachregion and year.

controls is also a major determinate of program costs. The imposition of
further controls now, for example, requires the use of currently available
technology. Delay in achieving actual reductions until after the early 1990s
allows consideration of possible new technologies as a potential option.
The presumed advantages of such delay, however, must be weighed
against the potential for environmental damages in the interim. Additional
parameters such as the permissibility of emissions trading, requirements
for NO, caps, NO, substitution for S02 reductions, and coal miner protection also affect the magnitude of cost estimates. Finally, it is important
to note than an actual strategy, if implemented, might well include mitigation measures as well as emissions reductions, thereby influencing the
ultimate cost total. 37
37. Liming has been suggested as one mitigation strategy for inhibiting the aquatic effects of
acidification. However, the effective use of lime requires a great deal of information about the
hydrological and chemical properties of each water body. To date, only small-scale attempts at
restoration using liming techniques have been made. While costs for individual lakes may vary, it
is possible to estimate an average cost per lake. Those costs probably would fall into a range of
$75-$200K/lake if one assumes: x cost equals $200/hectare (ha) for materials and application; (2)
x lake size equals 20 ha; and (3) preapplication planning and post-application monitoring based on
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A number of studies provide information about the overall costs to
representative emitters for reducing the precursors of acid deposition."
These analyses provide substantial insight into the costs under alternative
control regimens, especially for capturing SO 2 reductions. Conclusions
about the costs of achieving aggregate S02 reductions in the utility sector
have been quite uniform across studies. Annualized cost estimates range
from $1 to $2 billion for a 40 percent reduction, and from $2 to $4 billion
for a 50 percent reduction. Cost consequences of $5 to $6 billion are
estimated for 66 to 75 percent reductions." The estimated average in-

creases in electricity rates to accomplish such a reduction in utility industry
SO2 emissions have ranged from 1.4 percent for a four million ton rollback
to 8 percent for a twelve million ton rollback. Naturally, rate increases
as well as control costs for individual utility systems may be substantially

greater than the average values.
Surprisingly, at least to economic intuitions, these recent studies suggest that the control cost consequences of alternative strategies for S02
control have only minor differences. State Implementation Plan (SIP)
systems tend to be as effective as economic incentives systems in addressing long-range transport.' This is mainly because of the greater
historic costs for EPA's Clean Lakes Program. More monitoring of results and practical experience
might eventually reduce costs, but one must question society's willingness to make the necessary
heavy investments in time and dollars to characterize the limnology of tens of thousands of lakes,
ponds, and streams. Widespread liming of forest soils to mitigate acid deposition impacts also would
appear to be nearly always economically and probably technically impractical. Liming, therefore,
does not seem to be a viable economic means for overcoming widespread acidification unless the
perceived benefits of restoration are extremely large or unless no less costly means of restoration
are available. Thus, although the efficacy of mitigation strategies such as liming and/or accelerated
research have been debated, congressional attention has focused on the merits of emissions reductions
strategies based on cost or equity criteria. See A.V. Holden, Surface Water, in ECOLOGICAL EFFECTs
OF ACID PRECIPITATION, A REPORT OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT GATEHOUSE-OF-FLEET,

U.K., SEPT. 4-

7, 1978 (M.J. Wood ed. 1979).
38. Rubin,InternationalPollutionControlCosts of Coal-fired Power Plants, 17 E"v'T SC. & TECH.
366-77 (1983); U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, The Regional Implications of Transported
Air Pollutants: An Assessment of Acidic Deposition and Ozone, Interim Draft (1982); and McGlamery
& Torstick, Cost Comparison of Flue Gas Desulfurization Systems in POWER GENERATION: AIR
POLLJTION MONITORING AND CONTROL (K.E. Noll & W.T. Davis eds. 1976).
39. None of the cost studies explicitly consider the rather unique decision problem of the utility
industry, the manner in which these problems influence its institutionalized habits and modes of
thinking, and therefore the observed costs on which the aforementioned studies are founded. There
are circumstances under which costs of control in the industry are likely to be above those that
would be experienced by profit-maximizing, perfectly competitive producers of the identical type
of output. The size of the increase is unknown. See Goldberg, Regulation andAdministered Contracts,
7 BELL J.ECON. 446-48 (1976); and Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory
Constraint52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052-69 (1962).
40. At least in the economic literature, a broad consensus exists that economic incentive systems
such as marketable emission permits are as much as an order-of-magnitude less costly than is the
current SIP-based system of controls. See Seskin, Anderson & Reid, An Empirical Analysis of
Economic Strategiesfor ControllingAir Pollution, 10 J. ENVT'L ECON. & MGMT. 112-24 (1983); and
Atkinson & Tietenberg, The EmpiricalPropertiesof Two CasesofDesignsfor TransferableDischarge
Permit Markets, 9 J. Ervr'L ECON. & MGMr. 101-21 (1982).

Summer 19861

FINANCING ACID RAIN CONTROLS

aggregate quantity of emissions that localized economic incentive strategies allow in order to meet a given local ambient standard. 4 Emissions
are distributed spatially such that the dispersal properties of the local
atmosphere are used more effectively. These greater emissions provide
more material for long-range transport. Given the gradual way in which
SO 2 combines with other atmospheric constituents to form SO4 , instead
of imposing the primary sulfate burden on the surrounding area, each
point source makes an incremental contribution to a regional sulfate problem. Moreover, each source's impact is related inversely to its impact on
the local ambient problem. The more SO 2 that returns to earth close to
the source, the less remaining for chemical transformation into S04 = over
longer temporal and spatial dimensions. When SO2 is removed to meet
ambient standards that account for long-range transport, the cost advantage of the economic incentive, strategies is drastically reduced.
It is clear from the preceding overview that alternative interpretations
of the science and economics of acid rain are plausible. Table 3 demTable 3. Alternative Interpretations of the Science and Economics of Acid Rain
Rationale for Maintaining Status Quo
Aquatic ecosystem effects are only documented damages in
eastern North America. Fish population losses are limited to a
small percentage of the lakes that have been studied in the
U.S., primarily in the Adirondacks.

Rationale for Taking Action Now
There are thousands of potentially sensitive watersheds throughout
eastern North America whose fish populations may be threatened by acidification.

Non-aquatic ecosystem effects theoretically are plausible but
only circumstantial evidence exists. Terrestrial ecosystem findings are complex and equivocal with only limited empirical
data for adverse effects on forest productivity, crops or soils.
Sensitive soils may require decades for cation depletion.

Adverse effects on forest productivity and other terrestrial ecosystems may result from acidic deposition through mechanisms
such as leaching of soil nutrients or mobilization of toxic metals. Responses are likely to be subtle and, therefore, difficult
to detect prior to onset of major damages.
Sulfur appears to dominate on a long-term average basis. Aquatic
responses have been shown on a limited empirical basis at
deposition rates >30 kgtha/yr with some responses observed
in the 20 to 30 kg/ha/yr of wet sulfate range.

The effects of acidic deposition are sufficiently ambiguous to
preclude calculating a target loading rate that definitely alters
aquatic or terrestrial systems.
Nitrate often dominates the acidity released during spring snowmelts in the northeast but insufficient data are available to
develop target loadings for nitrate induced water quality effects.
Existing data offer little evidence that the acidity of precipitation in eastern North America has been increasing for decades.

The areas of highest sulfate deposition lie over and immediately
downwind from the region of maximum S02 emissions in easter North America.
For a given emission magnitude, acid deposition attributable
to a source will decrease as distance between source and receptor increases.

Chemical transformation processes are not well understood so
specific source-receptor relationships cannot be defined. Current uncertainties preclude specifying an optimal spatial strategy for imposing emissions reductions.

Existing models and empirical data for zones of influence suggest that in the eastern U.S. sources more than 1000 km (600
miles) distant from receptors probably contribute much less
acidic deposition than do closer sources.

Lack ability to measure reliably dry deposition which may be
especially important for local source contribution to total deposition.
Existing atmospheric models cannot predict event variability
in deposition but episodes of high acidity may cause much of
the acidification.

Existing models and data analyses can give a qualitative sense
of the relationship between sources and receptors.

Control benefits are largely intangible while control costs appear to be large.

Associated air quality effects on visibility, particulate matter
loadings, and materials are highly likely and, while unquantified, may be economically significant.

SO2 emissions reductions over a broad area for a long time
period may produce essentially proportionate reductions in acid
deposition.

41. Atkinson, The Effect of Global Optimization on Locally Optimal Pollution Control: Acid Rain,
in ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVES ON ACID DEPOSITION 21-33 (T.D. Crocker ed. 1984).
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onstrates how such existing information can be used to construct a policy
rationale for either maintaining the status quo or taking further action
now with respect to initiating acid deposition control measures. First, the
extent as well as the rate at which damages are induced by acid rain
remains uncertain. However, the perception that acid deposition is an
environmental problem combined with its salience on the policy-setting
agenda compels a response by government. Second, man-made sources
generally are the overwhelming contributors to acid deposition in eastern
North America. While expensive, control technology is available to reduce significantly emissions from those sources.4 2 Third, a recent National
Academy of Sciences report concludes that it is reasonable to assume
that reductions in SO 2 emissions over a broad area for several years will
produce an essentially proportionate reduction in annual average SO4 +
deposition for that area.43 Finally, other parameters of air quality in eastern
North America such as regional visibility, particulate matter loadings,
and ambient SO 2 levels are affected strongly by the precursors to acid
deposition. They are likely to improve if atmospheric loadings of precursor emissions are reduced. Thus, while uncertainties about nonaquatic
ecosystem effects and sitespecific changes in deposition patterns and pH
within sensitive receptor areas persist, it is feasible to outline the elements
of a control program. As a consequence, it is important to consider the
revenue generation alternatives available for financing such a program.
ALTERNATIVES FOR FINANCING CONTROL COSTS
Acid rain forces policy-makers to confront a typical environmental
controversy. While a scientific foundation for some kind of government
action exists, popular perceptions of the degree of environmental risk
may be more powerful motivations for government intervention than
actual scientific evidence. Moreover, the United States has a long tradition
of undertaking regulatory action to demonstrate public concern or to
simply "do something" in the face of crises. And, as a society, we often
implement risk-reduction strategies on the basis of only fragmentary evidence of hazards themselves or the relative costs and benefits of alternative
strategies." Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) has noted, "The crux of the
acid rain cleanup problem has always been the cost of cleanup and who
should bear it. "45 As a result, the financing issue, including questions of
42. OECD, COAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: COSTS AND COSTING METHODS (1983).
43. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACID DEPOSITION ATMOSPHERIC PROCESSES IN EASTERN NORTH
AMERICA: A REVIEW OF CURRENT SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING (1983).

44. See THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION (R.W. Crandall & L.B. Lave
eds. 1981).

45. Mosher, Acid Rain Debate May Play a Role in 1984 Presidential Sweepstakes, 15 NAT'L J.
1998-99 (1983). See also Sununu, Acid Rain: Sharing the Cost, I ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 47-58
(1985).
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equity, increasingly has become the focus of both the public policy debate
and the symbolic politics surrounding allocating the costs of an SO 2
reduction program.
The Electric Utility Rate-Making Process
In one of the more commonly discussed financial alternatives, the
Congress or the EPA would set emission targets. Each state would then
allocate its share of the required reductions among the electric utilities
in that state.
Two scenarios exist for allowing the individual utility systems to determine how to achieve their reductions quotas. Under one scenario, each
utility would decide on an appropriate strategy to achieve the necessary
emissions reduction. The utility would then ask its state public utility
commission (PUC) to permit the level of rate increases necessary to offset
the additional control costs. This scenario leaves the actual choice of
specific compliance approach to the discretion of the utility and/or the
various state governments. The second scenario also would use the ratemaking process to generate capital for financing acid rain controls. But
the actual array of control options to be employed in order to accomplish
the S02 emissions reduction would be statutorily mandated. Under either
scenario, the affected utilities generally would have to pay for construction
costs via their rate structures. Electricity cunsumers, on the other hand,
would pay for emissions reductions only after the control technology
became operational, unless construction-work-in-progress (CWIP) were
allowed. The capital costs for acid rain controls typically would be amortized over a fifteen year period, although the amortization period could
range anywhere from ten to thirty years. Operating costs for pollution
abatement would be recovered on an annual basis. To the extent a utility
was not fully reimbursed for its acid rain control investments, the remaining cost increment would be shifted to its owners and/or investors.
Because a program for reducing SO 2 emissions diverts capital away
from availability for investment in other sectors of the economy, the
electric utility rate-making process is one of the more economically efficient mechanisms available for funding such a program.46 The incremental administrative costs should be relatively low, especially compared
to other approaches, since the rate-making process relies on an established
system. In addition, reliance on the rate-making process results in imposing control costs on those utilities which are required to reduce emissions consistent with the polluter pays principle which underlies most
46. An efficiently implemented eight million ton regional rollback in SO 2 emissions is estimated
to cost $3.7 billion on an annualized basis in 1995. Utilities would pay $3.1 billion and other
industries would pay an additional $0.6 billion. These cost estimates are based on an analysis of S.
3041 pereformed by ICF, Inc. See ICF, Inc., Analysis of a Senate Emission Reduction Bill (1983).
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existing U.S. environmental statutes. According to economic theory, electricity generators (utilities) and consumers (rate payers) would receive
information about the true costs, including the environmental impacts,
associated with their production and consumption of electricity. Presumably this information would cause them to adjust their behavioral patterns
accordingly.
Such an approach, however, is not without some disadvantages. Reliance on the utility rate-making process to finance acid deposition controls
would tend to concentrate the costs of SO2 emissions reductions on utilities
burning high-sulfur coal. Table 4 indicates that electricity consumers in
some states would receive relatively large rate increases in the initial
years of such a control program. For example, a ten million ton reduction
Table 4. Percent Changein Electricity Rates for 10 Million Ton Reduction'
Region
New England

State
CT
MA
ME
NH
RI
VT

Average
Mid-Atlantic

Average

6.1
6.1
3.2
3.2
6.1
3.2

3.2
3.2
2.3
2.8
6.5
3.6

IA
IL
IN
MI
MN
MO
OH'
WI

Average
South

b

4.7
DE
MD
NJ
NY
PA

Average
Midwest

Percent Increase

3.3
0.7
13.5
3.6
-0.9
13.0
17.8
8.3
7.4

AL
AR
FL
GA
KY
LA
MS
NC
SC
TN
VA
WV

-2.1
2.9
3.7
4.6
10.8
0.4
12.8
1.2
1.2
10.1
2.6
6.0
4.5

Costs basedon % charge in electricity rates in 1990 for a first year revenue requirement on a composite bill assuming intrastate
trading.
bExcludes the District of Columbia,
Adapted from: Wetstone, Paying for Acid Rain Control: An Introduction to the Trust Fund Approach, 2 THEENVT'LFORUM14-20
(Aug. 1983).
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might increase utility rates in the Midwest an average of 7.4 percent.
While those midwestern states could partially or totally protect their lowincome consumers from absorbing such an increase with some form of
assistance, such a financial subsidy would require allocating a greater
share of the overall control costs to more affluent individuals and/or
industrial customers in those states adopting an assistance program.
A rate increase of that magnitude could have harmful effects on the
Midwest's already depressed economy as well as on individual rate payers
in the region. For example, many long-term investments have been made
based on historical electricity rates. In addition, if rate increases actually
are substantial, utility systems may seek to reduce their compliance costs
by fuel switching, importing electric power from Canada, or reducing
generation instead of scrubbing to achieve required emissions reductions.
To the degree that utilities are able to reduce their SO 2 emissions by
switching from reliance on high sulfur local coals, the Midwest is likely
to experience reduced growth in regional coal production. This threat to
the future pattern of high-sulfur coal production is a plausible outcome
for several reasons. The current electric utility rate-making system encourages the minimization of capital expenditures instead of minimization
of generation costs per kilowatt hour (kwh). To the extent that utilities
fail to receive a rate of return commensurate with the risks involved in
capital expenditures, generation options with relatively high operating
and maintenance (O&M) costs are viable choices for utility managers.
For example, some electric utilities have been reluctant to convert their
oil-burning units to coal. This is the case in spite of the fact that the longterm fuel saving for such a power plant conversion would more than
offset the increased capital costs at the front end.47 Similar considerations
would tend to cause a utility to fuel-switch from a high-sulfur coal rather
than install a flue gas desulfurization (FGD) system. Moreover, given
widespread negative attitudes toward FGD among utility executives,
switching instead of scrubbing is likely even if the costs per kwh for
scrubbing were cheaper.
Finally, the rate-making system tends to front-load control costs into
the early years of the payback period. The front-loading feature could
make the first year's rates as much as 50 percent higher than the longterm average costs of the program. Rate-making reforms, such as allowing
CWIP, could equalize rate increases over time. However, because the
normal rate-making process forces utilities to raise the funds for financing
acid rain controls through the capital market, utility systems with low
allowable rates of return, poor prospects for future growth and/or high
47. Brenner, Coal and Electricity Generation:An Economic Perspectivein OPEC,
(E.S. Rubin ed. 1983)

POLLUTION ABATEMENT 282-86

COSTS OF COAL

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

(Vol. 26

indebtedness are not likely to be capable of financing controls without
some public sector assistance. As a result, irrespective of the science of
acid rain, those utility systems are likely to fight control proposals based
on economics alone.
Alternatives to the Electric Utility Rate-Making Process
Alternatives to the normal electric utility rate-making process are generally less economically efficient. However, those options may be preferred for several reasons. First, most allocate the costs of financing an
SO2 emissions reduction program over a broader segment of the population. Expansion of the base thereby reduces the probability that any
one group receives substantial electricity rate hikes.48 The alternatives to
the rate-making process involve raising all or part of the funds for financing controls on the basis of electricity production, emissions, fuel
use, general revenues, or a combination of these sources.49 The options
also provide opportunities to target funds on the basis of additional social
or economic goals. For example, revenues could be used to provide
subsidies to severely impacted rate payers, especially to low income
consumers. They also might be used to mitigate adverse employment
impacts in the Midwest due to shifts in the level of high sulfur coal
production. The following section reviews the advantages and disadvantages of those alternatives to the normal utility rate-making process.
Generation Fee. Proposals for a generation fee on electricity production continue a recent trend in environmental legislation. Both the
Superfund for hazardous wastes and the nuclear waste storage programs
rely on forms of generation fees to subsidize clean-up efforts.5" The most
likely scenario for implementing a generation fee requires utilities to
collect the revenues as a kilowatt hour surcharge. The fee could be
imposed on all electricity generation or on fossil-fuel electricity production. Applying the fee to the latter seems more logical since hydroelectric
and nuclear capacity are not sources of S02 emissions while fossil fuelfired power plants are. The money collected by the fee would be invested
in a trust fund administered by either the Treasury Department or the
Environmental Protection Agency. Income from the trust might be used
to fund capital costs, O&M costs, some combination of the two, or for
other targeted purposes such as coal miner or rate payer assistance.
The fees proposed to date range from one to three mills per kilowatt
48. A argument can be made that it is less disruptive and, therefore, more socially desirable to
require a number of small adjustments rather than a few large ones.
49. All of these options would give two more congressional committees jurisdiction over legislation for acid rain control-the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees.
50. See Wetstone, Paying for Acid Rain Control: An Introductionto the Trust Fund Approach, 2
THE ENVT'L FORUM 14-20 (1983).
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hour.51 A typical residential customer uses approximately 750 kwh of
electricity per month.52 A three mill/kwh fee would increase the consumer's monthly bill by about $2.25, although some slight regional differences
would exist in terms of the actual percentage increase reflected in utility
rates by adopting a generation fee. To the extent that the tax revenues
did not fully subsidize control costs, electricity users would bear additional rate increases beyond the generation fee."
In spite of the low rates, a generation fee, with the rate set in either
real or nominal terms, can produce massive amounts of revenue. For
example, using projected 1985 fossil fuel-based electricity generation, a
one mill/kwh fee would raise approximately $1.2 billion per year in the
eastern United States. If the fee were imposed on a forty-eight state basis
as proposed by H.R. 3400, the estimated revenues would increase to
$1.75 billion.5 4 Clearly, a generation fee is an effective means for spreading control costs over a larger base, making the impact on individual
regions or states relatively small. As a result, the generation fee approach
should not significantly affect competition beteween electricity and other
energy uses. A generation fee is also relatively simple to collect. It essentially is equivalent to a sales tax on electricity consumption so it is
attractive from an implementation perspective. As is true for any of the
options, the generation fee concept does have some bases for criticism.
Although the generation fee is based on output rather than input, it still
would make low-sulfur fuels more attractive than high-sulfur coal. Low
sulfur fuels would be more appealing because, as noted above, utility
companies would prefer to switch fuels instead of paying for the O&M
costs of a scrubber. As a consequence, a premium would exist for low
sulfur fuels unless their use was prescribed by control legislation.
The most serious weakness of the generation fee approach is its failure
to give credit for current and historic pollution abatement efforts. Table
4 demonstrates this problem. Since an individual state's liability becomes
a function of its generation level, states with high generation and relatively
5I. A mill equals one-tenth of one cent.
52. Personal communication, T. Brand, Director of Environmental Affairs, Edison Electric Institute, March 1984.
53. Consumers would also be subject to an indirect cost-higher prices for goods produced by
those industries subject to the tax. However, there are relatively few products other than possibly
steel for which the cost of electricity is a major component of their total cost.
54. With the exception of direct taxes imposed upon states in proportion to population, the rule
of liability to federal taxes must take no account of geography. See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12
(1927). While Congress is entitled to regulate by taxation, see Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533
(1869) and Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939), the uniformity clause may constitutionally preclude
applying the revenue generation options examined in this section to some but not all states. Therefore,
the appropriate base for examining these fees/taxes is probably all 50 states. For a more extended
discussion of the uniformity clause, see THE CoNsTrrurtoN AND WHAT rr MEANs TODAY (H.S. Chase
& C.R. Ducat eds. 1974).
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clean units would not be treated differently than those high electricity
producing states with limited prior control. As a result, those consumers
who have already paid for FGD systems or low-sulfur fuels would pay
again to subsidize rate payers of utilities with relatively uncontrolled units.
The criticism remains valid even if the revenues are to subsidize, rather
than fully fund, control costs. Moreover, while a graduated rate based
on emission rates provides some incentive for electric utilities to operate
their less polluting units more intensively and offers some recognition of
past actions, it would create a somewhat artificial, although probably
marginal, economic discontinuity in load management decisionmaking.5 5
Btu Tax. A Btu tax is similar to a generation fee in many respects.
But using energy consumption as the basis for allocating revenue generation makes it possible to access an even broader base. This follows
because a Btu tax could be applied to all fossil fuel use or to consumption
above a given level. For example, industrial boilers, process heat applications, and mobile sources in the transportation sector as well as utility
boilers consume fossil fuels. That fuel use could be taxed on a Btu basis.
As a result, if industrial and utility tax rates were the same, utilities wofild
only provide approximately two-thirds as much revenue reflecting their
share of total U.S. fossil fuel consumption.56 The tax would either be
calculated from fuel consumption or a surcharge on fuel purchases. 57
From an administrative standpoint, the latter would be much simpler to
implement.
A Btu tax would impose a larger percentage price increase on coal
than on other fossil fuels. Consequently, reliance on the Btu tax option
to finance acid rain controls has a major drawback. But, the percentage
price increases for coal, oil, and natural gas are roughly proportional to
the relative adverse environmental externalities which each produces.
Thus, to the extent an fncentive is created, it would be for more efficient
energy use. The fewer Btus consumed, the smaller the relative share of
the tax borne by fuel suppliers and consumers. While a Btu tax encourages
energy conservation, it further penalizes sources that have incurred energy
penalties by installing such equipment as baghouses or FGD to control
emissions. However, because it potentially uses fossil fuel consumption
55. Both nuclear power plants and hydroelectric facilities can only be substituted for fossil fuelfired plants on the margin in most utility systems. Nuclear plants are base-load capacity units and
hydroelectric capacity is constrained by the amount of water available for electricity generation. As
a consequence, any differential in load management of fossil-fuel power plants is likely to stem
from factors other than a generation-fee surcharge.
56. A tax of 6.13 cents/10 6 Btu (real) would be roughly equivalent to a I mill/kwh (real) generation
fee. The key difference is that about 35 percent of the revenues raised by a Btu tax would be provided
by the industrial sector.
57. It would be far easier to administer a surcharge on fuel purchases than to estimate consumption.
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Table 5. Distributional Impact of Selected Options for Financing Acid Deposition Reductions (Revenue Percentage/State)
Generation

Btu

State

Fee'

Tax

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

2.56
0.13
1.92
0.85
5.51
1.32
0.62
0.47
0.02
4.78
2.98
0.35
d
3.93
3.82
1.10

2.02
0.41
1.06
0.92
7.98
1.24
0.88
0.34
0.11
3.30
2.27
0.37
0.27
4.96
3.46
1.30

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
WestVirginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

1.36
3.27
2.51
0.12
0.97
1.60
3.25
1.16
0.84
2.73
0.30
0.50
0.80
0.25
1.15
1.30
3.56
3.57
0.78
6.10
2.44
0.10
5.78
0.05
1.29
0.15
2.75
11.71
0.63
_
1.10
0.40
4.16
1.43
1.45

1.52
1.91
4.51
0.32
1.36
1.63
3.64
1.54
1.04
2.07
0.43
0.68
0.44
0.26
2.45
0.92
4.71
2.16
0.48
5.53
1.85
0.66
5.53
0.20
1.10
0.26
1.91
12.10
0.71
0.10
1.67
1.16
1.74
1.71
0.78

5

Emissions
Feec
2.86
0.07
3.39
0.38
1.68
0.50
0.27
0.41
0.06
4.12
3.16
0.22
0.18
5.54
7.56
1.24
0.84
4.22
1.14
0.36
1.27
1.30
3.41
0.98
1.07
4.90
0.62
0.28
0.91
0.35
1.05
1.01
3.56
2.27
0.40
9.97
0.45
0.23
7.61
0.06
1.23
0.15
4.05
4.81
0.27
0.02
1.36
1.02
4.10
2.40
0.69

'Based on 1981conventional steamgeneration (i.e., non-hydro, non-nuclear) of electricity expressed as 106kwh.
'Based on 1980consumption of fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, andpetroleum products) expressed as 1012Btu.
'Based on 1980 S02 emissions estimates expressed as 106tonnes.
dStateshares<.001 percent of total U.S. revenue requirement.
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as a base, it does provide a mechanism for capturing NO, as well as S02
emissions reductions.
Emissions Fee. At least since the debate surrounding the adoption of
the 1970 Clean Air Act, economists have argued about whether the emissions fee approach provides a cost effective incentive for dealing with air
pollution problems." Unlike generation fees or Btu taxes which impose
equal costs on all, an emissions fee imposes a differential burden. In one
sense, it embodies the polluter pays principle. Emissions fees allocate
pollution abatement costs to sources relative to their prior success in
controlling emissions. As a result, electricity prices better reflect their
true cost, including the environmental impacts, of production. Presumably, an emissions fee approach to financing acid rain controls would be
based on the number of tons of S02 produced by specified sources. 9
Emissions could either be monitored or calculated using data on fuel
inputs and emission coefficients. Each approach to establishing a polluter's emissions level represents a substantial administrative undertaking,
especially were continuous emissions monitoring (CEM) to be adopted.
Given its implementation barriers, the emissions fee approach to financing acid rain controls remains attractive to environmental economists
for other reasons. An S02 emissions fee, unlike a Btu or generation fee,
would address directly the SO 2 loadings problem by changing emission
levels and raising revenue. Economic theory suggests that the ideal point
to set the fee would be somewhat lower than the marginal cost of control
for capturing the last ton of emissions reduction desired. In theory, sources
that could reduce their emissions relatively cheaply would do so to avoid
paying the fee. Other sources facing relatively large control costs generally
would choose to pay the fee.'
While attractive to economists, the emissions fee concept is not devoid
of drawbacks. Those disadvantages primarily involve its implementation
and its economic impact on domestic coal markets. As noted above, an
SO2 fee would be difficult to administer. Environmental authorities generally can estimate an individual power plant's maximum emissions rate.
But determining its total emissions is difficult, if not impossible, without
continuous emission monitoring. Thus, it would be necessary to invest
in either a widespread CEM effort or an "emission auditing program."
The SO 2 emissions fee imposes costs in a pattern very similar, but not
58. See E.S. MILLS, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1978).
59. A $120/ton S02 emissions fee, imposed on major sources, would raise roughly as much
money as a one mill/kwh generation fee. It would also induce a few sources to reduce their emissions
but it concentrates the revenue burden on those areas that will later be expected to incur the costs
of controls. On the other hand, these areas will presumably receive much of the benefits when those
revenues are disbursed. See The Acid Rain Lobby Picks Up Steam, 107 FORTUNE 33-36 (1983).
60. A variation on this theme would be to establish allowable emissions in a particular area and
then sell or give the right to produce a portion of that total to current polluters. They could then
resell those rights if desired.
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quite as focused, as an efficient allocation system coupled with the normal
rate-making process. As a result, unless fuel switching were constrained,
coal markets would be impacted. Under an emissions fee approach, Table
4 indicates that the costs of achieving SO 2 emissions reductions remain
concentrated on a few states. Some individual utility systems would still
have to pass through large expenditures to their ratepayers as a consequence. The SO 2 emissions fee, like the normal rate-making process,
therefore would create pressure for large amounts of fuel switching.
Moreover, it might not produce the level of geographical distribution of
SO 2 emissions reductions desired. An SO 2 fee used to allocate the reduction would prevent pollution sources from having to pay extremely
high costs per ton of SO 2 removed. Instead, polluters could choose to
pay the fee rather than make the investment in pollution abatement. As
a result, the emissions fee approach provides an obvious mechanism for
revenue generation. But it does not necessarily force an actual emissions
reduction.
Sulfur-Content-in-Fuel-Tax. A sulfur-content-in-fuel tax is essentially
comparable to an SO 2 emissions fee. However, the two approaches do
differ in one important way; the tax is based on sulfur input instead of
output. As a result, a sulfur-content-in-fuel tax would be imposed on the
sulfur content of fossil fuel purchases rather than on SO 2 emissions. It
probably would have to be based on SO 2 emissions/mmBtu nevertheless
in order to standardize among fuels. Once again, unless constrained by
law, most sources probably would prefer to shift to lower sulfur fuels to
avoid the tax. Like some of the other options, unless some type of credit
is provided, the tax also would penalize FGD-equipped sources. These
power plants would still be subject to the tax. Yet they already have made
substantial investments in air pollution control equipment which reduces
emissions but carries with it an energy penalty. FGD systems require fuel
to operate, thereby increasing fuel consumption but not electricity generation. With the credit, a sulfur-content-in-fuel tax's impacts would be
virtually identical to those of an SO 2 emission fee. Without the credit,
however, FGD systems are not likely to be installed on a retrofit basis
for utility air pollution control purposes. In theory, such a credit could
be set at a level to leave decisionmakers indifferent between scrubbing
and fuel switching, or could function as a positive incentive to encourage
scrubbing or high-sulfur coals. Finally, while it might be administratively
less complex to implement a sulfur-content-in-fuel tax than a SO 2 emissions fee, 6 such a differential has not been demonstrated empirically on
a widespread basis. Like an emissions fee, the sulfur-content-in-fuel-tax
approach to revenue generation does not guarantee that SO 2 emissions
61. This is the case because sulfur inputs measured in terms of liquid and solid fossil fuels can
be established in physical units in a more straightforward fashion than can outputs measured as
emissions from a variety of geographically dispersed point and mobile sources.
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reductions will accrue in an environmentally as opposed to economically
optimal fashion.
Federal Budget Outlays. Each of the above alternatives, including
the normal utility rate-making process, ties the mechanism for revenue
generation to some aspect of energy use and its residual air pollution
effects. It is possible, at least conceptually, to sever totally or partially
the linkage between acid deposition control costs and raising the revenues
necessary to fund those controls. The costs of acid rain controls could
be paid for directly by the national government as an item in the federal
budget. Approaching the financing question in this way spreads control
costs over the largest possible base, thereby minimizing individual liability. It also does not require a significant expansion of existing administrative structures. The revenue generation process is administratively
simple since the existing mechanism for raising federal funds would be
used.
Yet turning to general revenues not only implies that acid deposition
control is an important national concern but that consensus exists which
ranks it as a major priority. At this time, we simply do not have enough
evidence to conclude that such a consensus exists. In fact, some aspects
of reliance on the federal budget to subsidize controls call into question
the option's political feasibility. The use of direct federal budget outlays
represents a clear departure from the polluter pays principle. Otherwise
the polluter pays concept must be construed so broadly that it loses any
analytical meaning, since relying on general revenues is completely indifferent to prior abatement efforts. Unlike some of the other alternatives
which can be justified on the basis of energy policy objectives, financing
controls with general revenues also fails to change relative fossil fuel
prices, thereby promoting conservation or efficient end use management.
Finally, in a period marked by substantial concern over taxes and deficits,
the approach forces a clear choice between increasing one or the other.
These drawbacks seem sufficient to mobilize significant political opposition if not to preclude using direct federal budget outlays to finance all
or some part of the costs of acid rain controls.
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
Each of the financing alternatives outlined above as well as our summary of the science and economics of acid rain forces policy-makers to
confront the reality that control costs are high. There is simply no cheap
way to achieve substantial reductions in S02 emissions. Because each of
the options can be set at a level sufficient to have essentially equivalent
revenue generation capability relative to the other options, the selection
of an option ultimately becomes a function of distributional considera-
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tions. A recent analysis succinctly states the obvious conclusion: "Acid
rain is an environmental crisis with sweeping financial implications, but
its solution is political.", 62 In other words, classic equity issues-who
gains the benefits and who bears the burden of the costs and risks-are
likely to drive the decision to embark upon any particular financial path.
Steven Rhodes and Paulette Middleton, both at the National Center for
Atmospheric Research, have made this point as follows:
As acid rain control measures are proposed and debated, an important
observation must be taken into account in the formulation of regulatory policy; namely, that the current unregulated acid rain situation
produces certain benefits to some and uncertain costs to others.
Proposed regulation of acid-causing emissions, however, promises
certain costs for those who presently enjoy the certain benefits but
uncertain benefits for those who presently incur the uncertain costs.63
In such circumstances, the economic efficiency of any financial strategy
may be of only marginal importance. The very different patterns of interest
group mobilization and interaction which are likely to occur as a function
of the allocation of acid rain control benefits and costs are probably more
significant. Professor James Q. Wilson provides a useful typology for
anticipating these patterns: (1) Majoritarian politics, when both costs and
benefits of policy are widely distributed; (2) Interest group politics, when
both costs and benefits are narrowly concentrated; (3) Client politics,
when benefits are concentrated, but costs are widely distributed; and (4)
Entrepreneurial politics, when benefits are broadly spread, but costs are
narrowly concentrated.' Each of these categories appears to have some
relevance for characterizing the debate over financing acid rain controls.
The Limits of Client Politics
The current situation in acid rain politics demonstrates the limits of
client politics.65 Restricting acid rain policy to a research and development
(R&D) strategy, the consistent position of President Ronald Reagan's
administration, has become increasingly less defensible as studies of the
phenomenon proliferate. For some time, environmentalists and other parties-at-interest have been critical of the administration's policy of re62.
63.
64.
65.

R. HOWARD & M. PERLEY, ACID RAIN: THE DEVASTATING IMPACT ON NORTH AMERICA (1980).
Rhodes & Middleton, The Complex Challenge of ControllingAcid Rain, 25 ENV'T 6-9 (1983).
J.Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980).
Client politics are characterized by a situation in which:
Some small, easily organized group will benefit and thus has a powerful incentive to
organize and lobby; the costs of the benefit are distributed at a lower per capita rate
over a large number of people, and hence they have little incentive to organize in
opposition-if, indeed, they even hear of the policy .. .client politics produces
regulatory legislation that most nearly approximates the producer-dominated model.
Id. at 369.
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quiring more scientific research before taking action, terming such a
stance "stalling tactics" in the face of what they perceived to be sufficient
empirical evidence that a hazard exists.' As important as the growth of
scientific knowledge has been in giving credence to this criticism ,67 even
more significant has been the emerging perception that unacceptable inequities in the distribution of costs, damages, and benefits underpins existing policy. This perception has been more significant in reinforcing
calls for reductions as well as research now. Advocates of the status quo
in the acid rain arena have tried to reduce their waste disposal costs by
externalizing that burden to the environment and thus to the society as a
whole through client politics. As noted above, those utility systems,
primarily located in the Midwest, which generate electricity from high
sulfur fuels are one of the more significant actors in this process. Electric
utilities are not the only clients supporting the status quo, however. High
sulfur coal producers and miners, some railroads, chemical manufacturers, and Midwestern public officials also are influential on that side of
the policy debate. 68 Each of these groups, especially high sulfur coal
interests, has a vested interest in opposing acid rain control measures.
This opposition is especially the case to the degree that controls would
result in a significant redistribution of the current cost-benefit configuration.
On the other side of the political fence, a coalition has formed to press
for modifications in the existing situation. This "acid rain lobby" is
composed of environmentalists, land owners and small businessmen in
areas impacted by acid rain such as Ontario and New York resort com69
munities, Canadian power interests, and the Canadian government itself.
In fact, the Canadian interests have expanded the definition of client
politics to include the actions of the American government. As a recent
report of the Canadian House of Commons declared:
Acid rain is produced because firms, operating in their own best
interests, function within an institutional framework which cannot
effectively manage the environment. Under some circumstances, the
same agument can be made with respect to the political jurisdictions.
Since acid rain is associated with the long-range transport of air
pollutants, emissions originating in one political jurisdiction can be
deposited in another jurisdiction. Thus any government which operates in the best interests of its own citizens will tend to do little
about controlling emissions which fall in, and cause damage to, other
66. J.R. LOUMA, TROUBLED SKIES, TROUBLED WATERS: THE STORY OF ACID RAIN (1980); and
R.H. BOYLE & R.A. BOYLE, ACID RAIN (1983).

67. Mosher, Administration Loses its Umbrella Against Steadfast Acid Rain Policy, 15 Nat'l J.
1590-91 (1983).

68. FORTUNE, supra note 59.
69. Id.
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provinces, states, or countries. Just as acid rain allows firms to impose
external costs on third parties, acid rain allows one political jurisdiction to impose such costs on other jurisdictions. In this respect
governments behave like private firms.7"
To date, the acid rain lobby has focused largely on attempts to keep
the issue visible and on efforts to influence legislative and executive
initiatives. But, as is typical of client politics, they have had limited
success in organizing broader coalitions among the parties-at-interest who
might benefit from a change in the status quo. This limited success is a
direct result of the fact that the benefits from changes in the existing
system are highly uncertain and widely diffused while the costs of change
are highly concentrated and more certain.
Nevertheless, the acid rain lobby has had some success in its effort to
mandate additional S02 emissions reductions. It now appears that the
stalemate which has existed since the late 1970s is breaking up, and that
some modifications in the status quo are likely. The question is when
further controls may be mandated, the timetable for achieving those reductions, and how those costs are amortized. Two possible scenarios
under which an answer may unfold are suggested by the range of financing
alternatives available: abandoning client politics in favor of either entrepreneurial or majoritarian political arrangements.
PolluterPays or Cleanup Subsidies?
EntrepreneurialPolitics. On the surface, the most obvious way to
restructure acid rain policy would seem to involve following the trend of
environmental politics in recent years by implementing entrepreneurial
arrangements. Wilson characterizes this option as follows:
... a policy may be proposed that will confer general (though
perhaps small) benefits at a cost to be borne chiefly by a small segment
of society ....
Since the incentive to organize is strong for opponents
of the policy but weak for the beneficiaries, and since the political
system provides many points at which opposition can be registered,
it may seem astonishing that regulatory legislation of this sort is ever
passed. It is, and with growing frequency in recent years-but it
requires the efforts of a skilled entrepreneur who can mobilize latent
public sentiment (by revealing a scandal or capitalizing on a crisis),
put the opponents of the plan publicly on the defensive (by accusing
them of deforming babies or killing motorists), and associate the
legislation with widely shared values (clean air, pure water, health
and safety). 7'
70. SUBCOMM. ON ACID RAIN OF THE CAN. HOUSE STANDING COMM. ON FISHERIES AND FORESTRY,
STILL WATERS: THE CHILLING REALITY OF ACID RAIN, REPORT TO THE CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMMONS

(1981).
71. WILSON, supra note 64.
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While environmentalists point to the dying spruce trees on Camel's Hump
Mountain in Vermont as an example of ecological crisis, the current
scientific uncertainties surrounding the pervasiveness of the effects of acid
deposition make it difficult to create widespread public perception of a
crisis. Similarly, while individual scientists have legitimated acid deposition as a R&D topic, no dominant policy entrepreneur has emerged in
the U.S. political context. Therefore,the political feasibility of entrepreneurial politics appears to be very low.
Abandoning client linkages in favor of entrepreneurial politics involves
dramatic changes in the ways costs and benefits are distributed. Most
importantly, it involves the implementation of the economic philosophy
of polluter pays. As a result, entrepreneurial politics are compatible with
the use of the normal electric utility rate-making process as well as with
several alternatives to that process such as emissions fees or sulfur-content-in-fuel-taxes. Each of those alternatives would have the effect of
imposing control costs at the primary source of SO2 emissions. But while
placing the entire burden on the electric utility companies, and leaving
it to them to allocate the costs among their customers and shareholders,
may appear theoretically attractive for both efficiency and equity reasons,
it is also highly controversial. From the point of view of the Midwestern
states, it is simply too big a financial burden to bear. As a result, interests
in those states have pressed for various spread-the-cost schemes. Moreover, the utility industry points to the fact that none of the responses
currently under consideration mandates NO. reductions. This lack of a
requirement for further NO, reductions essentially is because additional
regulation of mobile sources, the primary emitters of NO, would mobilize
other powerful political interests.
Nevertheless, some variant of the polluter pays principle has dominated
the United States' environmental politics to date. Regional conflict certainly would be exacerbated by any scheme to subsidize cleanup efforts
in the Midwest. Heightened regional conflict is especially likely given
the widespread perception in other regions that Midwestern interests have
not been aggressive enough in reducing their emissions. As Edwin Rothschild of the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition has argued: "There is no
question that these Midwestern utilities have been lax in complying with
the Clean Air Act. They have been stalling for years in avoiding the costs
of installing scrubbers." 72 Moreover, some participants in the acid rain
debate are concerned that continuing down the technology-forcing path
(i.e., forced scrubbing) represents a bailout of the high sulfur coal producers. And, as lawyers Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler have
asserted, there is the possibility that FGD-forcing measures may have the
72. Mosher, supra note 45.
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perverse result of selectively increasing emissions in the East.73 Yet, to
achive a reduction of 40 to 50 percent within ten years which is the
magnitude proposed by control advocates, it becomes impossible not to
rely on a FGD retrofit strategy.
Certainly a continuation of the decade-long emphasis on engineering
mechanisms to ensure implementation of the polluter pays philosophy is
likely to lead to entrepreneurial politics linking such unlikely interests as
the clean air and the dirty coal groups. 7 We know from experience that
the polluter pays approach can lead to some very strange, yet very powerful, coalitions of energy, environmental, and economic actors. In fact,
this highly volatile and somewhat unpredictable dimension of entrepreneurial politics is a major reason that various spread-the-cost subsidies
have appeal.
MajoritarianPolitics. The most widely suggested departure from the
entrepreneurial politics path is the establishment of some majoritarian
political framework. Wilson says of this orientation:
All or most of society expects to gain; all or most of society expects
to pay. Interest groups have little incentive to form around such issues
because no small, definable segment of society (an industry, an occupation, a locality) can expect to capture a disproportionate share
of the benefits or avoid a proportionate share of the burdens.75
Distributive politics, in a nutshell, is the great appeal of majoritarian
policy. In the acid rain arena, the use of such financing options as generation fees, Btu taxes, or direct federal budget outlays promises to spread
the costs of mitigation across the broadest possible segment of the society.
Each reflects the classic majoritarian strategy for formulating a policy
response to a public problem. In an abstract sense, spreading the burden
means that the political feasibility of such option may be greater than
more punitive variants based on the polluter pays approach. But majoritarian options are neither as economically efficient nor equitable as entrepreneurial ones. Thus, while client politics may be fast approaching
its limits in the acid deposition case, neither entrepreneurial nor majoritarian politics guarantees consensus.
THE MISSING INGREDIENT: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS
The political attractiveness of an acid rain "trust fund" or some other
alternative to reliance on the normal electric utility rate-making process
73. B.A. ACKERMAN & W.T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
74. Id.
75. WILSON, supra note 64.
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is illustrated in this quote from a recent FORTUNE article assessing the
possible impact of legislative initiatives on the stock market:
For now, the stock market seems untroubled by the specter of acid
rain legislation. "There are psychological issues that haven't moved
the stocks yet," says Margery Obrentz, a security analyst at Kidder
Peabody & Co., "but as Congress gets more serious about this, we
expect the stocks to move a little." Perhaps the market is so untroubled because no one really expects Congress to slap an unproductive $10-billion or $20-billion capital expense on the utility industry.
Not that acid rain legislation won't pass; it probably will. But sentiment is strong against saddling one industry or region with the
whole cost, especially since smelters, steel mills, auto plants, and
home furnaces all contribute to the acid brew. So it may well be that
one of several spread-the-cost schemes under consideration will shift
the burden at least partially off utility shoulders.76
Attempts to expand the political framework to include some sort of
international cost sharing appear less promising in the near-term. At the
multilateral level, discussions of transboundary pollution have led to calls
for more R&D and monitoring. But, with the exception of the recently
announced "30% Club," the international community has had limited
success in developing control goals or timetables. And bilateral negotiations between the United States and Canada have been limited largely
to R&D agreements and symbolic acknowledgment that acid rain is a
problem."
Significantly, only interest group politics does not seem compatible
with the acid rain financing debate. Like most environmental issues, the
acid rain problem does not fit easily into a framework characterized by
concentrated costs and benefits. We know substantially less about the
value of damages prevented or mitigated than we do about costs. But we
can anticipate that benefits will accrue to different parties-at-interest, at
different points in time, and at different magnitudes than will be the case
with costs. 7" And we also know that a strong case can be made that the
U.S. political system and the international system function best when the
various parties-at-interest do have an understanding of distributional consequences. Environmental policy-making is no exception to this rule.
Professor Walter Rosenbaum has made this point a central part of his
analysis:
.. . public policy-makers are very likely to weigh the costs and
76. Magnet, How Acid Rain Might Dampen the Utilities, 108 FORTUNE 60 (1983).
77. Yanarella, The Foundationsof Policy Immobilization over Acid Rain Control, THE ACID RAIN
DEBATE 39-56 (E.J. Yanarella & R.H. lhara eds. 1985); and R. GOULD, GOING SOUR: SCIENCE AND
POLITIcs OF ACID RAIN (1985).
78. Regens & Crocker, supra note 29.
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consequences of environmental policy decisions in group terms. This
is not to suggest that various groups are the only components in the
public official's subjective map of the political world, but almost all
studies of official decision-making emphasize that group viewpoints
and the group consequences of policy choices do weigh heavily in
official thinking much of the time. It is a matter of fundamental
political intelligence for officials to discover, in any case, where
important interests stand on policy questions, environmental or otherwise. All this underscores the fact that what groups do in the political
arena-how they represent their interests, to which officials they
speak-is likely to have substantial consequences in shaping public
policy.79
This is conventional wisdom, yet none of the financial alternatives currently being considered in the acid rain debate reflects the interest group
politics framework. This fact alone may go a long way toward explaining

our inability to develop agreement on a control program as well as on a
financing strategy that is acceptable to the diverse range of participants
in the acid rain arena.

79. W.A. ROSENBAUM, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 21 (2d ed. 1977).

